“Bread and not too much talking!”: The Role of the Peasant in the French Revolution by Framm, Ava
Elizabethtown College 
JayScholar 
History: Student Scholarship & Creative Work History 
Spring 2021 
“Bread and not too much talking!”: The Role of the Peasant in the 
French Revolution 
Ava Framm 
Follow this and additional works at: https://jayscholar.etown.edu/hisstu 




“Bread and not too much talking!”: The Role of the Peasant in the French Revolution 
Ava Framm 





This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in the Discipline in 
the Department of History and the Elizabethtown College Honors Program 





Thesis Advisor (signature required)_______________________________________ 
Second Reader _______________________________________ 
Third Reader (if applicable)_______________________________________  




The French Revolution of 1789 is arguably the most significant set of uprisings in 
modern European history. While the peasants neither started nor finished the revolution, they did 
have a profound impact on furthering the revolution at certain times, especially during the Great 
Fear. The main questions I will be asking are: To what extent did the peasants have a role in 
elections to the Estates General? To what extent did peasants shape the list of grievances that 
representatives of the Third Estate took to the Estates General? Why and how did the peasants 
accelerate the revolution at key moments while never taking control of the government? To what 
extent did the Estates General, and subsequent assemblies, address the concerns of peasants? The 
main historians I have looked at are Georges Lefebvre, Albert Mathiez, Francois Furet, Alfred 
Cobban, John Markoff, and William Doyle. Based on the research conducted, I will argue that 











Sun beams reflect onto the columns and triumphal arcs set up outside the cathedral in 
Reims, the city responsible for the coronation of every French king for the last thousand years. 
This scene is shaded by a young Louis XVI, surrounded by people “intoxicated with joy,” 
expectant that this new king will return France to the glory and power felt by their beloved Sun 
King.1 Yet Louis, in all of his pompous splendor, was entirely oblivious to the fact that the 
people of Reims were starving in the streets, as the entire country was “in the throes of the most 
serious grain riots seen for years” resulting from drastically rising bread prices.2 Malnutrition 
affected rural families as well, thus increasing discontent in the countryside. While both the 
urban poor and the rural poor were impacted by the shortages, their experiences were different in 
several ways. The rural peasants considered seigneurial dominance an especially onerous yoke, 
one that impeded aspects of daily life, even the baking of bread. In a broader sense, they saw it as 
hindering them from improving their economic and social position. In response, peasants took 
significant action against their feudal lords. From the summer of 1788 to the spring of 1789, 
there was a notable increase in anti-seigneurial actions, which continued to grow the following 
summer. By fall, the insurrectionary peasants had focused their actions on the seigneurial regime, 
which continued to be the source of their ire.3 The connection between anger and hunger shaped 
the course of the revolution, fueling the rural crisis of 1789, which was stimulated as well by 
both hope and fear.4 The role of the peasant and the rural conditions during this time of turmoil 
were vital in opening up the French Revolution from an aristocratic political movement to a 
social movement. The next section will address the historiographical contexts of the French 
Revolution. This will be followed by an examination of the revolution’s aristocratic origins, the 
rural conditions leading up to the revolution, the importance of the Great Fear, and the impact of 




While the peasants neither started nor ended the French Revolution, they had a profound 
(yet oftentimes underrated) impact on turning the revolution from an aristocratic coup to a 
country-wide revolution that fundamentally impacted almost every aspect of daily life. Rural 
riots played an essential role throughout the course of the revolution. Much of the overall 
research into the origins of the revolution emphasizes the importance of the bourgeoisie, even 
though the peasants played just as much, if not a more significant role. As a country-wide 
phenomenon, peasant movements consequently deserve fresh consideration as a determining 
factor of the French Revolution. With over two hundred years’ worth of historiography on the 
origins of 1789, the problem I have faced as a student and scholar of the French Revolution, as 
historian Peter Davies describes, is sorting through what others have said about it.5 With so much 
extant scholarship, determining what is significant is difficult. To simplify the task, I will focus 
on notable historians from each major field of thought: the early historians, the Marxist/classic 
historians, the anti-Marxist/revisionist historians, and the modern historians like John Markoff. 
Jules Michelet, one of the most famous early nineteenth-century French historians, called 
for “history from below,” meaning “the history of those who have suffered, worked, declined 
and died without being able to describe their sufferings.”6 Michelet stated in his groundbreaking 
work, History of the French Revolution, that the more research he conducted, the more generally 
he found “that the more deserving class was underneath, buried among the utterly obscure.”7 It 
was in fact the peasants who were the chief actors of the revolution, and they communicated 
their “impulses” to those “brilliant, powerful speakers” in the Estates General and subsequent 
legislative assemblies.8 This concept was considered revolutionary at the time, in 1847, as most 
other historians were focused on the political consequences of the revolution rather than the 
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experience of the majority of French citizens. Michelet was followed by historians who 
subscribed to a Marxist approach to the Revolution. 
For most of the twentieth century, Marxist historians dominated revolutionary 
historiography. In their minds, the revolution as a whole was a class struggle between the 
bourgeoisie and the aristocracy—one in which the bourgeoisie triumphed—thus moving France 
from a feudal regime to a capitalist one and positioning France closer to the ultimate goal of 
communism.9 Despite the macroscopic focus on conflict between the bourgeoisie and the 
aristocracy, Marxist scholars shed tremendous light on urban workers and peasants, thereby 
building on Michelet’s call for “history from below.” The major Marxist historians include 
Albert Mathiez, Georges Lefebvre, and Albert Soboul. 
In The French Revolution, Albert Mathiez emphasized the class conflict between the 
bourgeoisie and the aristocracy in 1789, and subsequent bourgeois confrontations with the 
peasants and sans-culottes—arguing that the bourgeoisie allied with the popular classes to defeat 
the aristocracy and then betrayed the popular classes. 10The sans-culottes, literally individuals 
“without knee-breeches,”11 were the more radical members of the urban working class, 
particularly in Paris between 1792 and 1795. Born in eastern France to peasant farmers, 
Mathiez’s upbringing shaped his proletarian political perspective. In his book, Mathiez refers to 
the proletariat as “the passive citizens” yet highlights their abilities to rightfully defend 
themselves against power through violence.12 Mathiez’s focus on peasants and urban workers 
inspired Georges Lefebvre and Albert Soboul to give close attention to these groups in their 
respective works.  
Georges Lefebvre observed the causes of the insurrection from the peasant perspective in 
his seminal work, The Coming of the French Revolution. Lefebvre argued that there was not one, 
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but four revolutionary “acts” which occurred between 1787 and 1789.13 Each movement was 
initiated by a different social class, and by the final movement, all of France had taken part in at 
least some revolutionary actions. While Lefebvre goes into great detail regarding each social 
class and its relationship to the revolution, he ultimately concludes that the true beginning of the 
French Revolution was the peasant uprisings in the spring of 1788 stemming from the 
detrimental drought in the countryside.14 He divides the four revolutionary movements as 
follows: the aristocratic revolution, the bourgeois revolution, the popular revolution, and finally, 
the peasant revolution. 
Louis XIV, argued Lefebvre, had gradually subjected nobles and clergy to his authority 
and deprived the lords of their political power. Aristocratic retaliation—the climax of a “century-
long aristocratic resurgence or reaction, in which the nobility had sought to regain the pre-
eminence in the state of which Louis XIV had deprived them”—resulted in the calling of the 
Estates General in 1789.15 However, aristocrats quickly lost control of the proceedings. After 
being recruited by the aristocrats to aid them in action against the monarchy, the bourgeois were 
inspired to take matters into their own hand. In September of 1788, the parlement of Paris (the 
legislative body which had spearheaded the aristocratic revolution) declared the Estates General 
of 1789 would be constituted as it had in 1614. The bourgeois were furious because this meant 
that the aristocrats would dominate the assembly, and this anger fueled their goal of civil equality 
which had been inspired by the Enlightenment.16 The class struggle between the bourgeoisie and 
the aristocrats lasted until the creation of the National Assembly, a “precarious” victory that had 
been threatened by a “noble-inspired royal attempt to dissolve the National-Assembly.”17 The 
coup was defeated by the Parisian populace who had stormed the Bastille and initiated the 
popular revolution, which was the next revolutionary movement. This portion of the revolution 
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marked the shift from a revolution of elites to a revolution of the public. Those who had been 
oppressed and ignored for so long finally stood up to throw off the yoke of oppression, and 
eventually, the popular revolution transitioned into the peasant revolution. This stage of 
revolutionary actions by the lowest (yet largest number of) members of French society marked 
the fourth and final act of Lefebvre’s “symphony,” and may be the most overlooked and 
underestimated part of the revolution. 
The peasant class consisted of a majority of the French population. As soon as they saw 
the rest of the French people reacting to issues that, from the peasant perspective, appeared to be 
minor inconveniences, the peasant were inspired to take action regarding major problems they 
were facing, including food shortages, bad harvests, and absence of political power. In addition, 
peasants revolted “against the exaction of seignorial dues and labor services by aristocratic 
landlords.”18 The peasant movement pressured the National Assembly to pass the August 
Decrees (1789), which abolished feudalism and brought significant change for peasants, though 
the bourgeoisie maintained control of the government and ultimately ensured that their interests 
were protected above all others’.  
What strengthened Lefebvre’s argument was his citation of Ernest Labrousse’s book, 
French Economic and Social History. Labrousse, a fellow historian, wrote extensively on the 
economic and social aspects of the Revolution, with his primary focus covering eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century France. Labrousse’s book was well-respected among scholars of the French 
Revolution because of its extensive statistical information on the economic conditions of the 
peasants and lower class during the eighteenth century. Lefebvre “saw the peasant revolt as a 
defensive reaction of peasant communities confronted by increasingly demanding lords who 
were themselves increasingly inclined to participate in a developing rural capitalism.”19 
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Essentially, Lefebvre believed peasants were forced to react as circumstances grew increasingly 
worse for them.20  
As the son of a clerical worker,21 Lefebvre struggled financially, and he continued to do 
so until well into his fifties. Despite teaching in lycées in northern France for half his life, he had 
difficulty making significant connections with other renowned intellectuals until later in life. Due 
to his understanding of financial struggle (not only was he an underpaid teacher but he also had 
to provide for his parents and younger brother), Lefebvre was inspired to write on the role of the 
popular classes.22 Whereas Mathiez focused on overall class conflict and not one specific group, 
Lefebvre emphasized the extent to which peasants were active participants in the revolution, 
particularly during the Great Fear, which prompted organization among peasants, undermined 
seigneurial rights in many locales, and paved the way for national legislative action in August 
1789. Lefebvre’s focus on the peasantry was somewhat ironic considering Mathiez came from a 
peasant family and Lefebvre from a lower-middle-class family, but Lefebvre’s research led him 
to conclude that the peasants had played a key role. His focus on peasants, rather than the 
progenitors of the social class into which he was born, provides good evidence of Lefebvre’s 
objectivity. 
Not only did Lefebvre become a leading historian of the French Revolutionary, but he 
also inspired several of his students, one of whom was Albert Soboul. Born in Algeria and a 
student of the Sorbonne, Soboul’s work explored the lower classes, especially the sans-culottes. 
His two major works are A Short History of the French Revolution and The French Revolution 
1787-1799. Just as Lefebvre became the cutting-edge historian on the peasant in the revolution, 
Soboul became a pioneer for his vast research on the sans-culottes, adding a layer of depth 
beyond the analysis of Mathiez.23  Soboul believed that the sans-culottes were not a class but a 
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“loose coalition of artisans, labourers, and petit bourgeoisie.”24 Not only did he write his doctoral 
thesis on the sans-culottes, but several of Soboul’s books also focused on the role of this 
“coalition.” According to Soboul, “it was the joint . . . action that gave the French Revolution its 
unique character.”25 As he argued in A Short History of the French Revolution, “[T]he 
bourgeoisie intended to stay within the law. Before long, however, it was carried forward into 
more extreme action by the pressure of the masses, the real motive force behind the Revolution, 
whose energies were sustained by their own aspirations and the persistence of the economic 
crisis down to the middle of 1790.”26 
Despite the dominance of Marxist scholarship in the early- and mid-twentieth century, it 
did not stop another opposing interpretation from emerging. This approach, known as 
revisionism, focused primarily on the monarchy’s despotism but did touch on social, economic, 
and religious conflicts as well. The main contributors to this analysis were Alfred Cobban and 
Francois Furet. Cobban’s argument, as demonstrated in his book, The Social Interpretation of the 
French Revolution (1965), was that the revolution was primarily “a struggle for the possession of 
power and over the conditions in which it was to be exercised.”27 Cobban did mention the 
peasant revolts and their success in achieving economic power, as well as the social hierarchy of 
eighteenth century France, but he ultimately emphasized that the “supposed social categories—
bourgeois, aristocrats, sans culottes”—were in fact political ones in which less well-organized 
peasants were ultimately marginalized.28 Cobban acknowledged Lefebvre’s “valuable” study of 
the social structure of Orléans, but it was published after Cobban had written his book.  Furet 
also acknowledged Lefebvre’s significant analysis of the “peasant problem,” stating that 
Lefebvre “…had a richer knowledge and a surer grasp of the period than anyone,” but arguing 
that Lefebvre did not try to understand the political importance of the revolution.29 Furthermore, 
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Furet believed that “modern France was special not because it had gone from an absolute 
monarchy to a representative régime or from a world of noble privilege to a bourgeois society,” 
since the rest of Europe went through the same process without a revolution, but because “it was 
the first experiment with democracy.” 30 Following the revisionists, there have been several 
modern historians who have taken yet another approach towards the revolution. 
While there are several prominent modern historians of the French Revolution, John 
Markoff, in The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords and Legislators in the French 
Revolution, has provided a particularly masterful analysis of the peasants’ role in undermining 
seigneurial rights. Markoff is currently a Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the 
University of Pittsburgh and has published several books on the topic of the French Revolution 
and democracy. When Markoff wrote The Abolition of Feudalism in 1997, there was “little 
scholarly consensus on the causes and significance of the rural insurrection,” despite the light 
shed on peasant movements by scholars like Lefebvre.31 Markoff’s aim, as he stated, was to shed 
a revealing light on both the dialogue of the insurrectionary peasants and revolutionary 
legislators and their substantial impact in furthering the revolution—at actually making their 
voices heard and stimulating lasting change, rather than being outmaneuvered by the 
bourgeoisie, as Marxist scholars ultimately contended.32 Consistent with Markoff’s approach, I 
hope to contribute more to the causes and significance of the rural aspect of the French 
Revolution and its importance of furthering the movement at key moments. Since the passing of 
Lefebvre, the peasantry’s influence on the events of the revolution has all too often been 
underestimated, but that does not mean it was any less important than the other identified causes. 
While my goal is to add to the research on the role of the peasants, it is also important to note 
how the peasants were impacted and influenced by the other levels of society in order to 
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understand their broader role. I will begin by exploring the aristocratic origins of the revolution 
in order to provide a more wide-ranging understanding of the context of the Revolution. 
Aristocratic Origins of the Revolution  
France, being a feudal state, had deep class divisions. The nobles, clergy, peasants, and 
bourgeoisie had different mindsets and economic backgrounds. Before the revolution, France, 
which was dominated by nobles at the time, was the most powerful country in Europe. Not only 
did the nobles possess a majority of the country’s wealth, but they also owned approximately 25-
33% of the land, keeping approximately 25% of agricultural revenue for themselves.33 As the 
French monarchy coalesced, the nobility lost much of the political power it had had during the 
Middle Ages.34 Notably, during the reign of Louis XIV, the gap between economic privilege and 
increasing political impotence became a major source of contention between the monarchy and 
aristocracy. The aristocrats had long escaped most taxes, placing the burden on commoners with 
fewer resources, thus resulting in inadequate tax revenues to cover state expenses. This was 
another source of conflict, as the state was unable to collect sufficient tax revenue from 
aristocrats. Eventually, these tax exemptions became a part of a royal bargain with the nobles to 
relinquish their political power. By the 1700s, though, the royal government could no longer 
afford to go without this tax revenue, and the aristocrats demanded more political influence in 
exchange. The royal government demurred. Consequently, the burden of foreign wars, the 
unrestrained lifestyles of the nobles and high-level clergy, and the extravagance of the royal 
court were placed on the rest of the French people. This system subjected peasants to feudal 
regulation, including forced labor, the despised dîme (a 10 percent tax) that went to the Church.35 
A major factor that contributed to France’s economic problems was the extravagance of 
the royal court. In an attempt to recreate the power and prestige of Louis XIV, Louis XVI and 
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Marie Antoinette spent large sums impressing visitors. Like their predecessors, the royal couple 
maintained Versailles as their home because of the hunting and because it was close enough to 
Paris that Louis could travel there when he needed to, but far enough away that he did not have 
to live with his own people. France’s inequitable tax system severely hurt the peasants when 
Louis decided to financially back the American people in their fight for independence from 
Britain. He saw it as an investment in political leverage against England. The government could 
not collect sufficient revenue because of poor harvests that depleted peasant income. In an 
attempt to recover from the immense debt and resulting bankruptcy, revenue was needed. In 
1787, hoping to consult with ministers about reforming state finances, Louis convened the 
Assembly of Notables, which was comprised of members of the First and Second Estates—the 
clergy and aristocrats—who paid few taxes. Unwilling to take on more of a financial burden, the 
Assembly refused to agree to the new taxes the royal government proposed. Their refusal led to 
the implementation of new taxes on poor French people. Greatly displeased, the notables told 
Louis that there would be no agreement to tax reforms unless a general assembly representing 
the entire nation was called.36 
France had been an absolute monarchy since Louis XIV, while other powerhouses in 
Europe, like Britain, had modernized and moved toward constitutional monarchy. Change came 
to France in May 1789 when Louis called the Estates General, which was the national legislative 
body. Class divisions were evident in the division of the French population into the three estates, 
whose life experiences were vastly different. While the nobles and the clergy were clearly split, 
the rest of the population, which included the bourgeoisie and the peasants, all fell into the Third 
Estate. The last time the Estates General had been called was 1614. In those 175 years of silence, 
France’s population had almost doubled to 28 million, creating further class delineations. The 
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population of the Third Estate was more than that of the First and Second Estates combined, with 
eighty percent of the French population being peasants.37 Since the nobility and the clergy had 
privileges that the rest of the population did not, the Third Estate felt the heaviest burden of 
taxation. In sum, France’s financial situation was tremendously mismanaged, characterized by 
“disorder, corruption, and misrule.”38   
When the Estates General convened in the Palace of Versailles, a debate arose among the 
body as to whether voting should be conducted by estate or by head. Voting by estate would 
have given the first two Estates the upper hand, while voting by head would have given power to 
the Third Estate, since the King had agreed to double its membership in recognition of the fact 
that the Third Estate represented the vast majority of the population. Louis made the decision to 
have voting take place by estate, thus eviscerating the Third Estate’s potential leverage. The 
Third Estate retaliated and broke off from the Estates General, and on June 17, 1789, declared 
itself the National Assembly. The Assembly tried to meet at Versailles the next day and found 
the doors locked at the command of the King; so, they instead assembled in a neighboring 
building used as a tennis court and took the famous Tennis Court Oath, stating that they would 
not separate until a constitution was constructed. Louis attempted to put his foot down and reject 
the National Assembly, but to no avail. On June 27, he legalized the legislative body, only to 
later attempt to control it through military force. Meanwhile, a Parisian mob retaliated by 
destroying a local prison, the Bastille, on July 14. Still, Louis entered nothing about such events 
in his diary that day, reflecting only on a poor hunt in the forest around Versailles.39 Louis was 
utterly clueless about the important forces taking shape in France at the time. The storming of the 
Bastille was the first violent act of the Revolution and resulted in the formation of a Paris 
popular government, called the Commune, as well as a new military body, the National Guard. 
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Violent revolts soon erupted all over the country, and chateaux were ransacked, while tax 
collectors were assaulted.  
The peasants played no role in compelling the king to call the Estates General,40 as they 
were more focused on surviving the poor harvest of 1788. While the failure of the harvest would 
make the peasants important in turning the revolution from a political movement to a social 
movement, they were initially “passive observers.”41 What ultimately transformed the otherwise 
normal consequences of a poor harvest was the electoral campaign.42 The calling of the Estates 
General raised everyone’s hopes of a better future, but those hopes fell short when the monarchy 
attempted to limit the power of the Third Estate.  
After the revolution in the countryside and a subsequent movement known as the Great 
Fear (discussed below), the nobles and the clergy surrendered their privileges on August 4, 1789, 
later referred to as the August Decrees. Even Cobban recognized that these decrees would have 
never happened without the peasant uprisings in the countryside, for he states: “it is accepted by 
practically all recent historians of the revolution that what forced the National Assembly into the 
decisions of the night of the fourth of August was the widespread and alarming peasant revolt of 
the spring and early summer of 1789.”43 Members of the National Assembly (who were not 
peasants) concluded that “unless concessions were made to the peasantry the whole of rural 
France would remain in a state of endemic rebellion.”44 Not willing to take that chance, the 
nobility and the clergy conceded their power and agreed that “taxes shall be paid by every 
individual in the kingdom in proportion to his income,” thus suppressing all fiscal exemption.45 
The feudal dues that peasants had to pay to their lords (called seigneurs) were abolished, but 
compensation was provided in return for the absolution of the seigneurial dues. Finally, the 
corvée (the forced labor service on municipal roads), serfdom, and “other forms of personal 
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servitude” were eliminated without reparation.46 Just one month following the August Decrees, 
the Marquis de Lezay-Marnesia described France as “absolutely disorganized, given over to the 
most horrible anarchy.”47 At the time, he planned to emigrate from France, defending his 
decision by questioning “how can one remain in the midst of a people who, out of their lack of 
understanding, their frivolity… have become the cruelest people, the most coldly terrible?”48 
Despite the systemic reforms, and the loss so clearly felt by aristocrats like Lezay-Marnesia, life 
for peasants did not get much easier immediately. They were arguably the least responsible for 
the situation in which France found itself, but at the same time were the hardest hit. France was 
facing dark times, and even though the August Fourth Decrees brought some relief it was not 
enough to fundamentally change the experience of peasants overnight.  
The broader forces at work included the relationship between the aristocracy and the 
bourgeoisie, as well as the relationship between the aristocracy and the king. While the 
aristocracy and monarchy were the most visible elements of the Revolution, that does not mean 
they were the only important ones. The aristocracy, monarchy, and clergy represented a minority 
of the population with a majority of the power. Beneath the surface, we find there is an entire 
population of people whose experiences mattered, who were disproportionally affected by the 
financial crisis, and who played a fundamental part in the revolution. While these people have 
often been overlooked as influential contributors to the Revolution, it is important to understand 
the role that they played. Now that I have established some of the broader context of the French 
Revolution, I will look into what rural conditions were like during the revolution, and, 
specifically, the role that peasants played. 




The term “feudal,” as it was most commonly used at the onset of the Revolution, 
indicated a “collection of claims of one party upon another (in other words, feudal rights).”49  
The feudal regime (never a feudal regime), on the other hand, represented “a particular form of 
social order that was historically specific.”50 Essentially, in the feudal regime, the social order 
was made up of peasants who were financially beholden to the nobles and the clergy 
(monasteries and other ecclesiastical corporations controlled vast estates). Some wealthy 
commoners—those with the most resources—purchased noble titles so they could join the 
aristocracy, secure “a symbol of social prestige,” and profit at the expense of peasant farmers.51 
Other wealthy commoners—those with fewer resources—exploited large concentrations of land 
or took the leases of whole estates from wealthy absentees and sublet them to poorer men.52 
Altogether, the “rural elite” numbered around 600,000 people. Though a small fraction of 
France’s total population of approximately 28 million, these individuals dominated rural life. 
They were also well-represented, among all three orders, as Estates General deputies, who, in 
many cases, held seigneurial rights, had a vested interest in keeping the feudal system in place, 
and acted accordingly until pressured to do otherwise.53  
Though wealthy commoners were technically the apex of the “peasantry,” aristocratic 
seigneurs dominated most rural communities, standing above wealthy commoners and ordinary 
peasants alike. Small freeholders, renters, and landless peasants were the heart of the peasantry. 
Those who could not maintain themselves through farming alone earned additional money in a 
variety of ways, including wage labor, rural crafts, and weaving cloth. When those activities 
were still not enough, they would turn to seasonal migration, borrowing money, and even 
begging.54 The rural economy was an “economy of makeshifts,” which in good times was 
enough for a bare living but in bad times was insufficient. Survival depended upon labor of the 
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entire family, and if one member was disabled or there were not enough productive children, 
their living would crumble.55 Wintertime proved even more difficult for day laborers who could 
not find work. The struggle to find work extended to the warmer months when crops were poor 
as farmers would hire only as many laborers as necessary.56 As unemployment and scarcity 
increased, so did the number of beggars (which was already high).57 
While there were several delineations within the peasantry, every region and every 
category of peasant was affected by certain basic trends during the eighteenth century. The most 
important was a population increase that mainly occurred in the countryside. A larger population 
meant more mouths to feed, which, in turn, increased the economic pressure on peasant families. 
Furthermore, abundant labor was cheap labor; therefore, wages lagged way behind the rise in 
prices. Thus, peasants who were not self-reliant were hit especially hard by the massive, 62% 
price increase over the course of the eighteenth century. Additionally, they were hard-hit by tax 
increases between 1749 and the 1780s, which contributed to the peasants bearing a 
proportionately larger burden than other societal groups.58 
Peasants were the backbone of industrial labor force and were negatively impacted by a 
decrease in demand for textiles, contributing to an inability to afford the rising price of bread.59 
These two factors led to “disturbances up and down the country,” Even though peasants farmed, 
many were not self-sufficient, so like town dwellers they had to buy bread and flour, causing 
them to be hit hard by scarcity and high prices.60 In the 1770s and 1780s, ministers and 
intendants sought to transfer the corvée (labor due) into a money payment; but as most peasants 
could not afford any more fees, they opted for physical labor. The 1780s brought increasing 
fiscal burdens, including the monopoly that corrupt auctioneers had on all public sale of goods.  
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Before the Revolution, the taille* was the basic tax taken by the French monarchy.61 
While it varied in form and oppressiveness depending on the province, it was the most common 
tax that every social class was exempt from paying except the peasant class. In order to avoid 
paying the taille, one had to obtain significant class status, regional privilege, or personal 
influence, none of which the peasants had.62 Since most direct taxes were paid by people who 
lacked status and means, the monarchy could never raise taxes to an amount that was 
proportionate to the true wealth of the country.63 The monarchy was heavily reliant on indirect 
taxes, such as customs duties, aides on liquor, soap, etc., as well as the government monopoly on 
tobacco. Such consumption taxes were especially burdensome for peasants.64 Likewise, peasants 
had no exemptions from the gabelle (the state salt monopoly) or the draft for the militia.65 
Rebellion over taxes was common in the seventeenth century.66 But those in the 1780s came at a 
time when the state faced an unprecedented series of interlocking crises. What also set the people 
of 1789 apart from their ancestors was that besides their refusal to pay taxes, they refused to pay 
tithes and feudal dues.67 While the peasants declared their refusal to make payments towards 
their seigneurial dues, their feudal lords were unbothered because the lords did not believe that 
the peasants would take physical action against them. As we will see, they were wrong.68  
Most peasants, even small freeholders, were obligated to obey a seigneur. Feudal rights 
fell into three broad categories. The first was honorific rights, which involved the right to 
precedence on public occasions, the right to erect weathervanes on the manor-house, etc. The 
second was jurisdictional rights. Most local courts were lords’ courts, and lords were judges even 
in their own cases. The third was “useful rights” which included hunting rights, shooting, and 
(most importantly) the right to levy dues in cash or kind.69 Poorer peasants also suffered the most 
 
* Originally meant the “cut” taken by the lord from the subject 
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from harsh leases, leading to competition among peasants for farms. Leases were short and the 
landlord would frequently break them before they expired. Many times, farmers had to make 
extra payments to get the lease in the first place (money which they never got back if the lease 
was broken). Also, peasant tenants did not get paid for any improvements they made to the farm 
while they were leasing the last.70  
Two major delineations among the peasants were fermier (farmer) and métayer 
(sharecropper). The métayer’s terms with their landlord were shorter than those of the fermier, 
and the landlord could get more money out of a métayer.71 The process of the three-field crop 
rotation system, in which one third of the soil was left fallow each year, was very common in the 
countryside. Peasants were trapped by both custom and interest into continuing to use traditional 
farming techniques and were not rewarded for creativity or inventiveness.72 This perpetuated the 
feudal system and stymied economic and social change. 
The variety of terms used to describe different types of poverty represent the diversity in 
attitudes during the eighteenth century. The blanket term was pauvre, which implied that, at best, 
the individual lived at subsistence level. Furthermore, “dans un etat d’ingence absolue” 
represented the most destitute of the destitute, the lowest one could be on a scale of deprivation. 
People at this level had no food, clothing, or adequate shelter. They had already sold the few 
possessions that they had in order to survive.73Mendiant could be positive or negative as 
mendiant de profession was a man who relied on handouts, which was a respectable position 
when the individual was aged, sick, or mentally defective. However, if the individual was none 
of those things, they were considered lazy.74  
On the other hand, pauvre honteux, was the most common representation of a poor 
person. It consisted of either a man who failed to earn enough to support himself, had fallen ill, 
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or faced some other calamity; or of a woman without a husband who still had to support her 
children.75 Even the smallest towns had migrants “crammed into cellars and attics… many of 
whom had little hope of finding employment adequate for their support on any permanent basis, 
and who were consequently forced… to make a bid for outside assistance.”76 French society at 
this time still held respect for those who “kept up appearances,” rather than leaving their children 
to fend for themselves on the street or ceasing bathing because soap was too expensive.77 
Therefore, the poor did not create a “quandary” for the rest of society because those who lived 
comfortably had no qualms about judging the unknown pauper. They did not understand the 
struggles of the poor, nor why they were struggling. They were so far removed from the day-to-
day fight to survive, that it did not impact their lives.78  
The power seigneurial judges had over peasants is another reason why the seigneurs held 
sway. Not only did the judges rule over all cases involving feudal rights (including their own 
disputes with peasant farmers), but the French Monarchy “only suppressed seigneurial justice at 
its highest level, where it hampered royal power. It had left it in place at the lowest level, at 
ground level, where it oppressed and stifled royal life.”79 In short, the crown was more concerned 
with defending itself and expanding its power than protecting the peasantry from oppressive 
seigneurial justice. As we will see, what ultimately put an end to the oppressive seigneurial 
regime was the pressure that revolutionary peasants put on legislators during the French 
Revolution.80  
Although the revolution began with the aristocrats forcing the king to call the Estates 
General, it was fueled by the peasants. The importance of the rural conditions is often 
overlooked by historians who do not focus on the role the peasants played, but it is vital to 
understand that rural populations did not wait for Versailles or Paris to tell them what to do. 
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Initially, while the aristocracy stirred up trouble in Versailles, the peasants in the countryside 
only heard rumors of what was going on.81 It is hard to justify paying for paper to write down 
grievances when one cannot afford bread, and they were focused on surviving.  The origin of 
their distress began with a prolonged drought that led to a horrid harvest in the spring of 1788, 
which increased the already high bread price and made grain scarce.82 Heavy rains and a 
hailstorm in July and the continuation of heavy rains in August destroyed the remaining crops in 
the northwest and Northern part of France near Paris. An early and long winter, starting in 
November, brought heavy rains and lots of snow and frost—a damaging combination for the 
already fraught farmers. Through no fault of their own, farmers lacked the ability to pay 
autumn payments to seigneurial landlords.  
Casual workers were hit first, followed by craftsmen, then winegrowers. In some regions, 
weather destroyed three-quarters of the vine stock.83 By March 1789, laborers and managers 
struggled to make ends meet,84 which led to discontent, unrest, and eventually rioting in local 
markets. Whereas aristocrats and wealthy commoners had a cushion of profits from successful 
harvests, the “small peasant cultivators… had no safety margins.”85 Those who were most 
affected by the destructive weather patterns were the ones who could least afford it, forcing them 
to suffer while other profited off of their misery. 
The grain rioting would have made 1789 a social catastrophe by itself, but the duality of 
the “old-style food crisis and the new style political crisis” inspired rural insurgencies all over 
France.86 Soup kitchens opened and monastery storerooms were raided in rural areas in an 
attempt to stave off hunger.87 These “symptoms of agrarian distress” endured until early 1790.88 
Relief for the poor was highly restricted and most did not qualify for relief, making them  
“totally dependent on private subsidies.”89 Furthermore, by the end of the Old Regime there were 
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2,185 hopitaux generaux which were based on a model created by St. Vincent de Paul in the 
1660s.† These institutions were financially supported by donations and legacies “given by the 
faithful” as well as revenue they received from special privileges presented to them by the 
monarchy.90 Individual bishops, municipal councils, and ecclesiastics took the initiative to found 
these institutions. Very few of these establishments catered to the rural poor and were created to 
help only a very specialized section of the destitute—the sick, aged, crippled, or orphaned (the 
so-called “deserving poor”). This left the bulk of the poor, unemployed men and women and, 
even more commonly, the children of laboring men, to the mercy of their fellows.91 
While the imagined relief for the poor would have been a collection of voluntary 
donations from the parish that were given to needy families, this was not the case. The St. 
Vincent de Paul Society, the Jesuits, and the Tridentine councils all fancied bureau de chante or 
bureau d’aumônes‡ that would have operated in this manner. Unfortunately, any sort of 
collection for the poor relied upon individuals and their continued effort which hindered long-
term success. While some religious houses made seasonal donations, they were minor and made 
little impact on the lives of the destitute. While a few distributed bread every week, this was the 
exception rather than the norm.92 Those who did give to the poor gave minimally, and donations 
were meager at best. Catholic charity was based on moral claims and practitioners’ consciences 
which was not always enough. Theoretically, the poor were given a privileged position, but this 
led to questions of whether or not material assistance was also holy. Further, the question of 
whether some forms of poverty were more holy than others impacted people’s willingness to 
give all while people continued to starve. 93 
 
† The patron saint of charitable societies, St. Vincent de Paul is most popularly known for his charity as well as his 
compassion for the poor. 
‡ alms office 
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What truly helped bring to light the sufferings of the peasants were the cahiers de 
doleances. Considered a form of strategic speech, cahiers were documents that expressed 
grievances against the state and were drafted to be taken to the Estates General by 
representatives from each community.94 Cahiers created within the Third Estate were “drawn up 
by villages, towns, urban guilds, and corporations.”95 Even in peasant villages, they were often 
influenced by privileged commoners such as lawyers and doctors. In some cases, models from 
Paris were used to write the cahiers, which likely led to the peasants and villagers feeling 
constrained and unable to fully express their grievances.96 The cahiers from peasant 
communities nonetheless reveal much about peasant grievances, as well as a general awareness 
that the meeting of the Estates-General offered a “unique opportunity to be rid of a wide range of 
burdens which they saw as interlinked.”97   
The demands expressed what the peasants wanted for the general good.98  Even though 
they were negotiated among villagers—and even influenced by nobles and urban elites who 
exercised influence over the peasants—they were addressed to a much wider audience. 
Furthermore, cahiers were “speech in context,” representing the grievances of the peasants at a 
particular moment in time.99 Markoff explored two types of documents of the Third Estate: 
cahiers of the parishes and cahiers of the deputies. First, cahiers of the parishes represent the 
peasants of rural France, although local priests, urban lawyers, and seigneurial judges aided or 
hindered their drafting. These cahiers were not taken to Versailles and were only presented 
within the parishes themselves. An example of this type of cahier from the St. Germain d‘Airan 
parish in Brittany included grievances mainly about taxes, but also the fixed price for salt, and 
the fact that all males had to pay three livres annually regardless of fiscal status, in order to 
maintain a proper military.100 Instead of a multitude of taxes, they suggested that there should be 
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a single tax levied on all general property, regardless of the status of the property owner, and that 
there should be a fixed price for salt.101 Second, the cahiers of the deputies of the Third Estate 
were heavily influenced by the middle class, and represent the “non-noble portion of the upper 
reaches of urban France.” 102 Simply speaking, these were the urban notables who were aware of 
the peasant grievances carried by the delegates from the parishes. Included among the most 
widely discussed subjects are regular meetings of the Estates General, taxation in general, and 
the collection and allocation of taxes.103 These cahiers were taken to Versailles as part of the 
Estates General.104 The grievances that the peasants filed help us to understand the larger social 
context of the time.105 Despite the fact that lawyers often wrote cahiers, we can still learn about 
peasant grievances from them. 
Undoubtedly, the situation in France at the end of the eighteenth century was dire. 
Scarcity and unemployment were beyond critical levels. People were starving and finding 
nowhere to turn. Arthur Young, an Englishman who traveled through France during July of 
1789, provided a first-hand account of what it was like in France at this time. He wrote his 
findings as he traveled through the French countryside, stating on July 10 that: 
Everything conspires to render the present period in France critical. The want of bread is 
terrible: accounts arrive every moment from the provinces of riots and disturbances and 
calling in the military to preserve the peace of the markets. The prices reported are the 
same as I found at Abbeville and Amiens – five sous a pound for white bread, and three-
and-a-half to four sous for the common sort eaten by the poor. These rates are beyond 
their faculties [ability to pay] and occasion great misery. It appears plain to me that the 
violent friends of the commons [radical revolutionaries] are not displeased at the high 
price of corn, which seconds their views greatly and makes any appeal to the common 
feeling of the people more easy and much more to their purpose than if the price was 
low.106 
 
Young described what the people in France were going through, and it did not take him long to 
observe the desperation and destitution of the French people. He recognized the revolutionary 
appeal for those who were living on nothing. For them, the system had failed, and they saw no 
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way out of the situation they were in, nor was it their fault that they were in that situation to 
begin with. Radical revolutionaries could easily argue that the system had dealt the peasants a 
bad hand and that it was time for them to stand up and take charge in order to change the system 
that had kept them down for so long. 
Some groups were affected by the circumstances more than others, and after speaking to 
a woman affected by the aforementioned trends, Young wrote:  
An Englishman who has not travelled cannot imagine the figure made by infinitely the 
greater part of the countrywomen in France. It speaks, at the first sight, hard and severe 
labour: I am inclined to think, that they work harder than the men, and this, united with 
the more miserable labour of bringing a new race of slaves into the world, destroys 
absolutely all symmetry of person and every feminine appearance. To what are we to 
attribute this difference in the manners of the lower people in the two kingdoms? To 
government.107 
 
Young saw that women had to work even harder than men in order not only to provide what they 
could for their families, but also to provide their families with a new generation whose fate was 
almost assuredly (at least at that time) the destitute life of a peasant in a feudal system. He placed 
the blame for France’s situation on the government, which consisted of officials who had no 
interest in addressing the problems facing their countrymen. They benefited from the system and 
were motivated to keep it the same, committing any new generations to a life of servitude. 
However, the people were able to change the system and break the cycle, but only as a result of 
the success of the Great Fear. 
The Great Fear and its Impact 
Rural panics were far from rare occurrences in eighteenth century France, plaguing the 
entirety of the country for most of 1789. The Great Fear occurred from mid-July through the first 
week in August 1789, while agrarian disturbances in Provence and Dauphine in the southeast, 
Franche-Comte in the East, and the North East had broken out in the previous winter and 
spring.108 Louis XVI had called troops to Paris in July 1789, touching off the storming of the 
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Bastille. After the violence in the capital, the people in the countryside were convinced that 
hostility from government troops would travel from the capital to their cities and regions. The 
peasant revolts that occurred in the Normandy Bocage, the Franche-Comté, and the Mâconnais, 
coupled with the storming of the Bastille, put much of the population on edge, believing they 
would have to take up arms and protect their homes from certain attack by a mix of the rebellious 
peasants and the “brigands” (mercenaries sent by the aristocracy to tamp down on revolutionary 
action). Lefebvre, nevertheless, argues that the “Great Fear” was no great fear at all, but a 
combination of several smaller, concentrated panics that overall gave the peasants the confidence 
they needed to get out from under the seigneurial thumb. In many instances, peasants ransacked 
the homes of lords and burned the documents detailing their seigneurial dues. Such action was a 
catalyst to a monumental movement. 
Word of mouth can sometimes be the most dangerous weapon of all. Telling a story to 
someone is like playing the game “Telephone.” One person thinks of a word or phrase, whispers 
it to the next person in the circle, who then whispers it to the next person, and so on and so forth. 
By the end of the chain, the original word or phrase has been completely distorted and is 
unrecognizable. Following the storming of the Bastille, people let their imaginations run wild, 
seeing a possibility for widespread, organized violence. A universal fear ran through the country, 
as the people were convinced that the aristocrats were going to overthrow the National Assembly 
through violence. Crippled by fear, rural communities precariously took measures to protect 
themselves from the invisible and non-existent threat. Just as rumors are spread by those who do 
not know the whole story, the panic was spread by people “with no official status of any 
kind.”109 Couriers and postilions working for the postal service also played a vital role in the 
spread of panics. While word-of-mouth can travel almost as quickly as stagecoach, these couriers 
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would carry documents from one post to the next. No one really cared how truthful they were as 
long as they warned others about the supposedly certain threat of oncoming violence.110 
It is important to remember that the peasants in the countryside were still starving at this 
point. While the towns did their best to restore order (since no higher authority came to help), 
everyone was still focused on the one problem that had yet to be solved: how to replenish food 
supplies.111 In Paris, for example, in an attempt to stimulate the economy, the deputies sent 
representatives to buy food in local markets since many Parisians could not afford food to due to 
the significant rise in food prices. What also contributed to the growing tensions were the 
suppositions that chateaux had been hoarding corn.112 Not only did these officials have to worry 
about the local people becoming violent when they saw corn being moved towards the city and 
away from their starving families, but they also had to worry about protecting the stores and 
mills in areas where the townspeople could not afford to buy corn. When a secret report about 
large quantities of grain being hidden in Pontoise turned out to be true, representatives were sent 
to retrieve the supplies with an escort. The locals were so excited about the possibility of food 
that the troops were unable to enter the city.113 While the threat of violence loomed large over 
many towns, the threat of starvation was even more powerful and even more real. 
There was an overarching fear of vagrants that flowed through all of the revolts, for 
“every beggar, vagrant and rioter seemed to be a ‘brigand.’”114 The rumored brigands were made 
up of the “floating population” of Paris, specifically the local unemployed, and what furthered 
the Great Fear was the rumor that spread among the provinces after July 14  that the brigands 
scattered all over the country as municipalities increased their security measures.115 In the age-
old line of believing half of what you see and none of what you hear, the most significant reason 
the fear was felt by so many was due to the urgency and certainty of impending violence. Several 
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people attempted to cool tensions, only to be considered traitors, and even the seigneurs of a 
region, whether afraid of bandits or peasants, furthered the progression of the panic. Rationality 
was arguably absent as desperation and fear drove people’s decisions. Sometimes, when there 
was a town in the midst of a local panic, a traveler or courier would inadvertently exacerbate the 
fear by warning a neighboring town, normally in an attempt to be a good Samaritan, which 
would only fuel the internal fears of the anxious public. At Lourdes, for instance, there were four 
separate signals of alarm on August 6.116  
The fear of brigands created the Great Fear, but it is important to understand that they are 
two separate events. In short, the fear of brigands, which was fueled by rumors and possibilities, 
paved the way for the Great Fear. The Great Fear, on the other hand, was seen and heard and 
spread at a faster rate because real events followed in its wake. Once the French people realized 
that the events of the Great Fear occurred at the same time, it led to rumors of a conspiracy.117 
The conspiracy theory was based on the idea that the aristocrats fueled the brigands into moving 
across France so as to frighten the rest of the population. The goal was to either “bring them back 
to the ancien régime or else thrust them into total disorder,” a belief that allowed the panics to 
have a greater importance than they otherwise would have.118 Ironically, the event turned against 
the aristocracy as it spread out of control. This culminated in new agrarian revolts that directly 
resulted from the Great Fear. 
Lefebvre’s main argument about the Great Fear being a misnomer is that every historian 
has gone along with the statement that the Great Fear was universal because they have confused 
it with the fear of brigands. He explains that: 
to admit that the brigands existed and might appear at any moment was one thing; to 
imagine that they were actually there was another. It was easy to pass from the first 
situation to the second: otherwise there is no explanation for the Great Fear; but the 
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transfer was not absolutely obligatory and though the whole of France believed in 
brigands, the Great Fear did not appear in the whole of France.119 
 
The fear of brigands and the Great Fear were two different types and instances of terror. One was 
a potential threat, the other an imagined situation. What happened was a transition from 
whisperings of a hypothetical danger to a societal imagination of what would happen (rather than 
if it happened) if those warnings became real.  
In areas of France where the transition occurred, we see the Great Fear make its 
appearance. For instance, Flanders, Hainault, the Cambrésis, and the Ardennes were not affected 
by the panic. Most of Normandy, Roussillon, Brittany, the Landes and the Basque country had 
no recorded instances of local disturbances. In the regions where the agrarian revolts had been at 
their worst – the France-Comté, Alsace, the Normandy Bocage and the Mâconnais – there was 
no Great Fear at all.120 The fear of brigands and the Great Fear were not mutually exclusive. Not 
all areas impacted by the fear of the brigands experienced the Great Fear, but all areas that were 
affected by the Great Fear felt the fear of the brigands. Today, we now understand that the fear 
did not break out everywhere at the same time, which was what preceding historians claimed. 
Lefebvre’s research enabled him to provide the names of the provinces and the subsequent days 
actual fears occurred, thus challenging the initial belief that it was a single event on a single 
day.121 The fear of something happening to them, their property (no matter how limited), or their 
livelihood was enough to inspire panic. 
The people of the French countryside supported the revolution as long as it did not occur 
in their backyard, threatening their sustenance. Once an uprising (or rumors of an uprising) was 
suggested as a possibility in another town, the townspeople (not including the peasants) 
panicked, convinced that they would be beheaded, and their houses burned by the peasants. 
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Whenever the peasants came into town on market days, for example, the rest of the townspeople 
were always on edge because they did not trust that the peasants were going to be peaceful.122 
They saw the peasants as agents of war, a threat to their peaceful (though oftentimes troubled) 
existence. The anxiety felt by the townspeople was not exclusively internal, as there were 
external warnings that fueled the response to what amounted to glorified rumors. 
Fear can be healthy while panic is almost always deadly.  The “warning panics” that 
preceded the rumblings of terror would begin with an alarm sounding, and for hours bells would 
echo. The women would go into a frenzy, convinced they and their children would be murdered 
in the street, while their husbands would bury anything of value and set the animals loose. Before 
fleeing with their wives and children, men would establish patrols to help defend the village.123 
Importantly, the fear of brigands did not subside once people realized they were not actually 
coming. People were still on edge as the critical period of the harvest crept up on them, and as 
long as the revolution seemed to be imminent, the dread continued.124 What enhanced the 
distress of the townspeople were the fresh alarms that ensued along the routes of the warning 
panics. The routes were more often than not valleys as they were the quickest route to 
neighboring cities and towns, flowing towards the capital. The fear spread back towards the 
capital.125  
Disorganized chaos plagued the entire country; when news broke of an incident, panic 
spread through new cities and towns, exacerbated by rumors of brigands spreading chaos. Fear 
continued to build and build as fresh waves of alarm spread through the French countryside, 
inching closer and closer to the city at the center of it all. Ultimately, the Great Fear was born 
from anxiety and the culmination of hundreds of small, local movements. But it is important to 
remember that while the fear of brigands was a universal one, the Great Fear was not: it 
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culminated only in specific areas of France. The Third Estate feared these uprisings the most 
because they believed the rioters were supported by aristocrats and foreign militaries brought in 
by Louis XVI. The fear had more consequences in the countryside than towns; most significantly 
it caused the downfall of the seigneurial regime.126 Most importantly, the panic brought 
municipalities together instead of tearing them apart. The fear forced town militias to organize 
and inspired the countryside to take up arms, thus bringing the Third Estate closer together.  
The terror caused by the Great Fear was the catalyst that was needed for the lowest level 
of society to band together and demand change. Without the organizing effect of the Great Fear, 
it remains unknown how long it would have taken for the peasants to organize themselves. 
However, it is reasonable to believe if the Great Fear had not happened, the peasants would still 
have organized eventually as their situation became increasingly dire. Unity of the Third Estate 
backfired onto the nobles and upper clergy, who wanted to keep this Estate weak. Ironically, the 
unity only happened because the Fear deepened the general hatred for aristocracy and 
strengthened the revolutionary movement overall.127 Instantly following the fear was a national 
unity which banded the peasants together and showed them the full extent of their strength. The 
Great Fear—and the unity that flowed from it—paved the way for the August Decrees and 
subsequent reforms.128  
The August Decrees and Subsequent Events of 1791 
The peasants had to put their trust in deputies to enact legislation to relinquish seigneurial 
rights. From August 4-11, 1789, the National Assembly debated several proposals concerning 
the fate of the feudal system in France. By August 11, the Assembly had destroyed the feudal 
regime “…in its entirety.”129 What began as a simple progress report on the Declaration of 
Rights, as the first step toward a constitution, ended with too much dinner wine and the personal 
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renunciations of the deputies of the First and Second Estates to aid in the common good.130 
Antoine Clare Thibaudeau, a lawyer who at the time of the Decrees had accompanied his father, 
recalls the early morning of August 5 as such: “Was it real? Was it a dream? ... [either way], The 
feudal regime did not fall for ignoble reasons: it was worn out, it was violently attacked and it 
was unsupportable.”131 A radical idea was approved on the night of the fourth that feudalism be 
abolished and the nobility and clergy relinquish their rights, and then the deputies spent the next 
week making this idea more palatable.  
Three legislative actions created during this week covered the division of seigneurial 
rights into two classes: “those to be abolished outright and those to be indemnified.”132 
Furthermore, seigneurial dues pending indemnification were to be paid, and tithes were to be 
abolished.133 As soon as the legislation was complete on the August 11, the countryside calmed 
down. Legislators kept a keen eye on the nuances of peasant opinion; as the peasants’ rage 
subsided following August 11, legislators shrewdly followed their lead. Deputies of the 
countryside, having seen firsthand the power of a peasant revolt, held peasant opinion in highest 
regard out of fear of retaliation from their peasant constituents. They found themselves in a 
precarious position, and many realized that faced with the insurrectionary movements in the 
countryside, they would be far better off getting on the proverbial bus than getting run over by it. 
Ultimately, the peasants were able to realize their power and forced those who had the ability to 
do something to act.  
In a letter to a fellow noble, dated August 7, 1789, the Marquis de Ferriéres described the 
legislative session as the ‘most memorable session in the history of any nation.’134 Although he 
wrote that he supported the Decrees because “it will deal with rural chaos; it creates national 
unity,”135 his main reason was his fear that “open opposition by noble deputies would be 
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dangerous, not merely for those deputies, but for the nobility in France as a whole.”136 The count 
de Virieu, on the other hand, decided to appease the wishes of the peasants because “when 
people are delirious, there are only two ways of calming them: generosity and force. We had no 
force.”137 Either way, the peasants had power for the first time in the revolution, and they were 
the first to prompt systemic change. 
In the months after the decrees, however, the deputies struggled to define the full import 
of the measures they had taken. Confusion bred new unrest, and the National Assembly once 
again began to fear retaliation from the peasants, prompting them to issue an ‘eternally 
celebrated’138 statement on the feudal regime in which clear cut abolition was established, as 
well as proposals for freedom of worship for non-Catholics, the abolition of parlements, and the 
extension of the emancipation to serfs to include colonial slaves.139 The revolutionary peasants 
controlled their deputies through the constant lingering threat of revolt. Deputies suffocated in 
the thick shroud of danger surrounding the proceedings of the National Assembly, never 
knowing if the peasants might revolt if an unfavorable decree were passed. Markoff cites several 
letters and journal entries from deputies who participated in the National Assembly during the 
August Decrees, and the common element in all of their tales was the sense of menace that hung 
over them in personal ways.140 For example, the Marquis de Lezay-Marnesia saw a France 
“absolutely disorganized, given over to the most horrible anarchy.”141 He seriously considered 
emigrating with eleven other deputies, asking “How can one remain in the midst of a people 
who, out of their lack of understanding, their frivolity… have become the cruelest people, the 
most coldly terrible.” The marquis would later emigrate to the United States.142 
Two more legislative decrees on rural affairs were enacted following the August Decrees: 
one in March 1790 and one in May 1790. The legislation that was created in March 1790 
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elaborated on the August Decrees, while the May legislation did not favor the peasants. The law 
in May set impossibly high standards for maintenance. Not only could peasants who owed a 
“bundle of obligations” not pay them separately, but they also could not be assigned individual 
allotments if they were collectively responsible to a lord.143 The peasants had managed to take 
two steps forward, but then were forced to take one gigantic step back. This exacerbated tensions 
between the peasants and legislators, deepening distrust. Once pandora’s box is opened, it cannot 
be closed, and the peasants were not done making sure their voices were heard. The deepened 
distrust between peasants and legislators ultimately provided the kindling that would later spark 
the fire of future revolts. 
The National Assembly, which encompassed the Third Estate, existed from June 17 to 
July 9, 1789. It served as the interim body between the Estates-General and the Legislative 
Assembly. The Legislative Assembly governed France from October 1791 to September 1792. 
This governing body came after the construction of a constitution as well as Louis’s attempted 
abandonment of his country, leaving the Legislative Assembly “…sandwiched between rising 
radicalism and an uncooperative monarch on whom it was forced to rely.”144 While Louis XVI 
reluctantly handed over his power as an absolute monarch for the benefit of a constitution, he did 
not have high hopes for the success of a constitutional monarchy. If Louis were to admit that 
France could survive without a monarch, then he would also have to admit that he had been a 
failure. In a last ditch effort to fight the growing radicalism of the revolution, Louis and his 
family broke their house arrest in Paris and attempted to flee France in the middle of the night on 
June 20, 1791, only to be stopped in Varennes the next day when the king was recognized.  
Once the news broke that France’s king had attempted to abandon his country, Louis XVI 
would never fully regain the trust of his people. Just as rumors spread quickly during the Great 
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Fear about possible revolts, the news of the king’s flight spread rapidly as it was considered 
“…news of the greatest significance.”145 This was the final affirmation that Louis XVI’s first 
priority would always be himself, abandoning honor, duty, and any remaining respect from his 
people in his flight from Paris. On July 17, 1791, a crowd of anywhere from 25,000 to 50,000 
people gathered on the Champs de Mars to sign a petition demanding a removal of the 
monarchy.146 The Marquis de Lafayette and the National Guard attempted to disband the group, 
but when the mob returned later in the day and began throwing stones, the National Guard began 
firing into the crowd. Anywhere from thirty to fifty people were killed.147  
Public perception of this event was divided; the ruling class vainly attempted to 
propagate an idealized version of the story, while the peasants quickly asserted their own 
narrative of oppression. The National Assembly and several government officials claimed that 
Paris was “…overrun by brigands that compromised the safety…” of the Capital, while other 
people believed that the event was a massacre of peaceful citizens resulting in the execution of 
martial law, indicative of a formidable desire to hinder the progress of the revolution.148 In the 
weeks and months following this incident, a decisive shift occurred in the French Revolution. 
Not only did the Jacobin Club, the radical group in France at the time, split, but it also broke the 
precarious trust between the French people, the Commune, and the National Guard. In short, the 
end of 1791 marked the end of the first stage of the revolution, but by no means did it signal the 
end of revolutionary tensions. Following the collapse of the monarchy (August 1792) and a new 
wave of peasant unrest (some of it anti-revolutionary, in terms of opposition to religious reforms 
and mass conscription), a new legislative assembly (the National Convention) finally “settled 
disputes about the interpretation of the National Assembly’s decrees of August 4, 1789, in favor 
of peasants, rather than landlord.”149 Abolished were compensatory payments for feudal dues. 
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Land of the church and of émigrés that had been seized by the state were divided into plots small 
enough for peasants to afford and auctioned off, while estates seized from counterrevolutionaries 
were distributed free of charge to “indigent patriots.” Major vestiges of seigneurial oppression 
were abolished, and a larger class of peasant freeholders emerged from the revolution. Peasants 
had indeed made their voices hear. 
Conclusion 
The perfect storm of an incompetent king, class divisions, and economic disparity paved 
the way for the breakdown of France’s political, economic, and social systems. Those who have 
often been ignored by history may have played one of the most impactful roles in the Revolution, 
not by choice, but by necessity. The peasants of France were literally starving to death, through 
no fault of their own, and were forced to take action in order to survive. The French population at 
the time of the Revolution totaled 28 million,150 and of that 28 million the poor French involved 
anywhere from 1/5 to 1/10 of the total population.151 The peasant population was divided into 
forty thousand communities, each with a mind of their own. But they were not making “…forty 
thousand disconnected revolutions. There was a French Revolution.”152  
While political conflict between the aristocracy and the king resulted in the calling of the 
Estates General, economic and social problems produced the full eruption of revolution 
throughout France. The calling of the Estates General allowed the people of France to fully 
realize how ancient and unequal their government was, and the Storming of the Bastille opened 
up the Revolution to action by the sans-culottes in Paris and peasants in the countryside.  
Understanding rural conditions at the time of the revolution is vital because the calling of 
the Estates General could not solve the economic problems that arose from a struggling peasant 
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class. When the peasants had enough of being under the feudal thumb, they revolted. These 
revolts spread as a result of the Great Fear, which ironically was not so great, and was mainly the 
product of rumors. The uprisings of the peasants led to the formation of the August Decrees in 
which the other two Estates forfeited their power to prevent further widespread revolution. As a 
constitution was created and Louis lost his power, peasant action again prompted change, 
compelling the National Convention to sweep away vestiges of seigneurial oppression, enlarging 
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